Introduction
The recent hike of crude oil prices has revived old fears about energy security. In addition to political and geological imponderability, a small but growing number of market pundits points out that deliberate overreporting of OPEC's crude oil reserves is one, possibly dramatic, source of uncertainty. 1 Thus, Bentley (2002) observes that "Saudi Arabia and Iran may well have signicantly smaller reserves than listed" in their statistics. The Economist (2006) reports warnings that suppliers as "Kuwait might have only half of the [...] oil reserves" they officially report. The Energy Watch Group, a Germany-based think tank, claims that when applying "the same criteria which are common practice with western companies, ...[Saudi Arabia's] statement of proven reserves should be devalued by 50%" (EWG (2007)). Consequently, the privately funded UK Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil & Energy Security reckons that "the world's supposedly proved reserves of 1,200 billion barrels are probably overstated by at least 300 bn barrels" (ITPOES (2008)). The International Energy Agency (IEA) expresses doubts "about the reliability of official MENA [Middle Eastern and North African] reserves estimates, which have not been audited by independent auditors" for decades (IEA (2005) ) and The Wall Street Journal (2008) reports that "[f]uture crude oil supplies could be far tighter than previously thought."
These quotes combine to the following picture: opaque national oil companies hold private information on major parts of world crude oil reserves, the amount of which they grossly overreport to the rest of the world. Yet, while the economic consequences of such a scenario would be dire, the actual motives of overreporting remain unclear. 2 To the economist, unfamiliar with the technical details of oil markets but trained to handle rational expectations, the following type of questions occurs: Why would oil suppliers overreport their reserves? After all, shouldn't they rather underreport reserves, since anticipated shortages raise current prices? Under which conditions can misreporting in general be credible and are these conditions likely to hold?
The present paper addresses these questions. It shows that in an ordinary setting of exhaustible resources, incentives to overreport emerge naturally through the following mechanism. Oil importers rationally decide to engage in resource-saving R&D whenever expected future supply of conventional oil is sufficiently low. Oil-exporters, in turn, overreport their reserves to raise expectations of future oil supply, discourage resource-saving R&D and thereby improve their future market conditions. 1 Many denitions of crude oil reserves exist. Quotations refer to the standard denitions proven and proven and probable reserves (conventional crude oil in place with 90% and 50% probability, respectively).
2 It is sometimes argued that OPEC members overreport reserves to increase their allotted production quotas, which are based on reserves. Indeed , after OPEC's quota system was established in 1983, members increased their reported oil reserves (see Campbell and Laherrèr (1998) and Bentley (2002) ). Market observers as the IEA or the EIA did not simply substract the reported increases and the question remains whether OPEC can manipulate expected future supply and the market's reactions to it.
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The paper frames the argument with a signaling game -a standard and suitable tool to analyze information rents. On the one side, an oil-supplier holds private information about the realization of its total stock of reserves and decides how to allocate it between two periods. An oil-consumer, on the other side, decides whether or not to invest in time-and resource-intensive oil-substituting R&D. Now, the oil-supplier can be said to misreport credibly (over-or underreport) if (i) observable current supply -the signal -is uninformative about its "type", i.e., the remaining reserves and if (ii) the resulting pooling equilibrium generates higher benets than the respective full information equilibrium. By this denition, misreporting and benecial pooling are one and the same thing.
Credibility requires that overreporting be backed by observable actions, and therefore is, in general, costly. More precisely, observable contemporaneous supply must correspond to the pretended amount of reserves and hence does not coincide with supply under full information. This requirement generates a cost of overreporting, which generally limit the supplier's willingness to overreport.
The analysis shows, however, that the cost of overreporting can be negligible and indeed even negative for a wide parameter range. The intuition for this surprising result is the following. Regardless of information asymmetries, the key problem of the oil-supplier is how to allocate the resource over time. In the absence of technological change, it is dynamically optimal to smooth supply across periods. Under the threat of resource-saving R&D, however, the smooth supply rule is no longer optimal but the supplier decreases current and increases future supply to discourage oil-substituting R&D. This effect is present under full information. Now, overreporting under private information generally requires an increase of current supply and hence brings the overreporting country closer to its unconstrained optimal -the smooth supply rule. Consequently, the distortions from overreporting eliminate the earlier distortions due to technological change, in which case the costs of overreporting can be said to be negative.
Two specic features of the model require a word of explanation. First, a two country setup is adopted. This feature allows for utility losses of the oil exporting country, whose population may suffer from self-generated disruptions in global oil supply. Abstracting from these costs (e.g., by assuming that a monopolist maximizes net present value of prots) would bias the model in favor of the nal result, i.e., the existence of credible overreporting. Second, the oil-exporter is allowed to levy export taxes. This assumption is necessary since the importer benets from substitution R&D mainly through a reduction of the exporter's market power. The analysis must therefore involve the prime tool through which the exporter exercises market power in the foreign market. This tool is an export tax.
The paper predicts that oil exporters tend to overreport if, rst, substitution R&D reacts signicantly to expected future oil supply, second, if oil supply is not competitive and nally, if the costs of overreporting are limited. As argued above, the last requirement is no meaningful qualitative criterion since theory does not establish a positive lower bound on the cost of signaling. Hence, the attention rests on preconditions one and two. Concerning the rst, empirical work shows that substitution R&D has indeed been responsive to oil prices (see Newell et al (1999) and Popp (2002) ). Figure 1 illustrates this relation in a suggestive way by jointly plotting the time-series of total R&D expenditure on non-oil energy sources in IEA member countries and crude oil prices for the years 1973-2006. 3 Concerning the second requirement, the proposition of non-competitive oil markets seems intriguing. Indeed, while empirical evidence on OPEC's effective market power is mixed, some recent studies argue that OPEC members successfully sacriced supply following the counter oil shock of 1986 (e.g. Smith (2003) ). In this case, a rst qualitatively application of the model cannot refute that OPEC member states overreport their crude oil reserves and further quantitative research is needed to quantitatively assess the issue.
The paper connects to the literature on the economics of exhaustible resources. Since its very foundation by Hotelling (1931) , a good part of this literature analyzes the effects of monopolistic market power. Following the oil shocks of the 1970s this research intensied (see Stiglitz (1976) and Pindyck (1978) ), extending to cartel formation, both theoretically (Salant (1976) , Ulph and Folie (1980) , and Gaudet and Moreaux (1990) ) as well as empirically (e.g. Griffin (1985) , for recent contributions see Smith (2003) , Almoguera and Herrera (2007) , Lin (2007) , and the references therein). About the same time Dasgupta and Heal (1974) sparked a line of research concerned with the substitution of exhaustible resources, either via exploration (see Burt and Cummings (1970) , Arrow and Chang (1982) and Quyen (1988) ) or directed technical change for substitution (e.g., Davidson (1978) and Deshmukh and Pliska (1983) ). The present paper's mechanism results from the interaction of both key elements of the above-mentioned literature -monopolistic supply and substitution efforts.
Only a small number of papers analyze asymmetric information about resource reserves. Thus, Gaudet et al (1995) and Osmundsen (1998) show that rms have incentives to underreport reserves: given that extraction costs are higher for lower reserves, underreporting of reserves means overreporting of costs, which, nally, saves taxes on prots. A recent study by Gerlagh and Liski (2007) analyzes how asymmetric information about resource reserves impacts the consumers' decision to invest in substitution technologies. In a rich dynamic setting, the authors focus on buyer's exposure to endogenous uncertainty of supply. The present paper, in contrast, emphasizes the seller's incentive and potential to conceal or to signal its type.
Finally, the present paper contributes to the ample literature on signaling games. It encapsulates a standard framework à la Spence (1973) in a two-period general equilibrium trade model. Recent extensions of the classical two-stage setup analyze signaling in an innite horizon setup. Thus, Kaya (2009) studies separating equilibria in an innitely repeated signaling game, where each period the informed player plays against a different uninformed player, the latter having observed previous signals. Gryglewicz (2009) , instead, analyzes the endogenous revelation of types in a stochastic, continuous-time game between one informed and one uninformed player. Such a setup seems indeed promising to frame the case of continued oil supply under asymmetric information. The interaction between the signals (initial supply) and the nal payoff (distribution of supply over time), however, causes analytical difficulties that make this route excessively complicated. Hence my choice to resort to a two-period setup.
Before turning to the main body of the paper it seems appropriate to contemplate what insights one can expect to obtain when applying a signaling model to the oil market. On the one hand, one can reasonably expect to refute overreporting -e.g., if the costs of signaling due to supply distortions exceed the benets. On the other hand, it will be impossible to actually prove overreporting: if the model revealed actions that constitute unmistakable indicators of overreporting, the concept of a pooling equilibrium would 4 6 be violated, making overreporting non-credible. Disproving overreporting might work; attempts to actually prove overreporting must fail.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model economy, describes the economic agents and the space of their actions, thus describing the game. Sections 3 and 4 solve the strategic game under full information and under asymmetric information, respectively, and discuss the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
General Setup
The world economy consists of two countries: country O (like the Oil-exporter, variables marked with * ) and country W (like the Western or Weakly-informed country, no * ). Both countries are populated by individuals of mass one and engage in cross-border trade in two consumption goods within each of two periods,  = 1 2. After the second period the world ends. The periods are meant to represent long time intervals, dened by the time it takes to develop a technology with which to substitute the natural resource. 4
Production. In  = 1 2, country W produces   units of a perishable consumption good  . Country O is endowed with a grand total of  * units of a second consumption good  , which represents a natural resource. The mining costs of  are negligible, but once  is mined, it becomes perishable. 5 Initially, country O's total reserves are uncertain and distributed according to
( with probability   with probability 1 − 
where  ∈ (0 1).
The model's setup is common knowledge, but realization of  * is known to country O only, which supplies  *  units in  = 1 2 under the constraints  *  ≥ 0 and
Preferences. Individuals receive total utility
7 where   ≥ 0 are consumed quantities of good  =   at time  = 1 2. The sub-utility takes the form
The convenient choice of this sub-utility has expositional reasons. First, quasi-linearity implies that income is transferable across periods, so that country W's (country O's) trade-off between the cost and the benets of R&D (of overreporting) simplies. 6 The logarithmic specication ensures that export taxes are bounded and have explicit analytic solutions; the additive term in the argument grants niteness of export taxes. 7
Government policies. Central authorities, or governments, act strategically. For simplicity "the strategy of country X's government" will simply be referred to as "country X's strategy." In this sense, country O supplies  *  in periods  = 1 2. In addition, country O sets gross export taxes  *  .
Country W's decides whether to develop a substitution technology. 8 More precisely, country W may incur   0 units of good  in period  = 1 to develop a constant returns to scale technology that becomes available in period  = 2 and enables country  to convert good  into a perfect substitute of good  with the marginal rate of transformation   1. Country  's substitution technology can be summarized by
The output generated by this technology will be denoted by  2 and one can write
For a convenient notation let country W's rst period output and second periods investment be denoted by  1 = 0 and  2 = 0, respectively.
Substitution R&D has two key characteristics. First, it is dened as a binary process (4), so that engagement in R&D is either zero or big time. This assumption is common to the literature (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Heal (1974) , Deshmukh and Pliska (1983) , Quyen (1988) , and Barrett (2006)   0 holds, which will be the case throughout the paper. 7 The additive term in the argument can be read as a ow of a perishable substitute to the natural resource in each country.
8 It will become clear that part of the return to substitution R&D is not appropriable so that substitution R&D must be centralized (or centrally subsidized), the costs are nanced by lump-sum taxes. time to be developed and to become applicable 9 . This second assumption is crucial to the paper's mechanism, as the argument relies on the fact that technological progress cannot be generated instantaneously. Clearly, if technologies became operable at the time of investment, R&D decisions would be delayed until uncertainty is resolved and information rents would vanish.
Timing. The timing of actions, summarized in Figure 2 , is the following. at  = 0 nature chooses the realization of  * , which is revealed to country O only. At the start of period  = 1 country O supplies the quantity  * 1 and sets the export tax  * 1 . Country W subsequently chooses the investment  1 and rst-period consumption is realized. At  = 2, country O sets export taxes  * 2 , supplies  * 2 ≤  * −  * 1 and the second period's equilibrium quantities are consumed.
Notice that country W chooses its strategy  1 after  1 and  1 are set. This assumption implies that country W can condition its strategy  1 on  1 and on  1 . If  1 ,  1 , and  1 were taken simultaneously, country O's overreporting via observable actions could not inuence country W's strategies and would thus be irrelevant for the equilibrium. The signaling game has no strategic content if the receiver of the signal cannot condition her actions on the observed signal.
Intuitively, country W's substitution R&D harms country O by generating competition of  -supply in period  = 2. To avoid such losses, country O may use its supply and private information, to discourage R&D activity. The costs and benets from doing so are central to the following analysis.
Consumers' Optimization
At  = 1 2 consumers maximize sub-utilities (3) subject to the respective budgets con-   0 for  =  ), optimal quantities are
When the  -market clears (i.e.,   +  *  =  *  +   ≡  ) the world price is
With this expression of the price, country W's expenditure on consumption goods equals the value of its production in domestic prices minus the value of inputs for R&D plus  -production, i.e.
is distributed lump-sum so that income of its citizens is
These expressions lead to equilibrium consumption
and the sub-utilities
The optimal policies ( *  ,  * , and  1 ) maximize the sum of the sub-utilities (7).
Optimal Export Tax
Both countries use their policies to maximize the respective total utilities (2), which involves an intertemporal trade-off between periods. Equation (7), however, shows that the rst period's export tax  * 1 affects neither the cost of country W's R&D nor its returns, which accrue in the second period only. Hence,  1 is independent of  * 1 and so is 8  * 2 . Also, when  * 2 is set in  = 2 all rst-period variables are taken as given, so that  * 2 is independent of  * 2 . Hence, the optimal export taxes  *  maximizes the sub-utilities  *  .
No substitution technology. In case   = 0, country W is not capable of  -production,   = 0 holds trivially and maximization of  *  from (7) leads to 10
Substitution technology. If, in contrast,  2 =  holds, the price ratio  * 2  2 cannot exceed the marginal rate of transformation 1 and country O's equilibrium export tax must satisfy the constraint  * 2  2 ≤ 1. When this constraint binds, expression (5) yields
Equation (9) implies that any increase of the export tax  * 2 above the level
− 1 induces an increase in  2 that keeps the relative price  * 2  2 constant. With (7) it is straight forward to check that, under (9) and at constant  * 2 , sub-utility  * 2 is decreasing in  2 if and only if  * 2 ≥ 1 or, equivalently, 2 ≥ 2( − 1) holds. Consequently, under condition  2 = , country O's optimal export tax is  * 2 = max {( * 2 + 2)  − 1 1} and the optimal export taxes are summarized by
Equation (10) has been derived assuming that the constraint  * 2  2 ≤ 1 binds. With (5) and (8), this is the case if  * 2 | =0  , or if  is large compared to country O's second period's supply:
In that case, equilibrium consumption (6) of both countries depends on country W's substitution technology. In particular, under  2 = 0 quantities are
while under  2 =  equations (6) and (10) lead to (5) and (8)  from (6) are positive.
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Combining both cases, sub-utilities (7) are
else (13) Together, equations (10) and (13) determine the equilibrium utility for given supply  *  and investment  1 and imply the following observations.
First, the sub-utility  *  is increasing in  *  , hence the resource constraint  * 1 +  * 2 ≤  * binds and the second period's supply equals the residual  * 2 =  * −  * 1 . This is a simple verication of Walras' Law.
Thus, conditional on country W not investing in R&D, country O's total utility (2) is maximized when the natural resource is supplied evenly across the periods
This supply rule is a degenerate version of Hotelling's optimal rule, which states that -correcting for time preference rates -optimal supply is smooth. Any deviation from optimal supply rules can directly or indirectly be attributed to substitution R&D activity.
Third, combining equations (11) and (15) shows that the possibility to engage in R&D affects world prices if and only if
holds. Intuitively, technology  can affect the price of  only if either the substitution technology is very efficient ( is large) or country O's endowment  * is small. For the rest of the paper condition (2) will be assumed to hold.
Finally, if country O's supply in the second period is large enough ( * 2  2( −1)), country W does not produce the substitute ( 2 = 0) even under  2 = . In this case country W's return to R&D consists of a reduction of import prices  * 2  2 in the second period. The returns to costly R&D are positive but non-appropriable, wherefore substitution R&D must be centrally nanced in country W (compare footnote 8).
12

Full Information
This section provides a benchmark by analyzing the Nash equilibrium of the sequential game, assuming that the amount of total reserves  * is common knowledge. It has been shown that all strategic interaction can be reduced to a two-stage game in which country O rst chooses  * 1 and then country W decides on  1 . Export tax and consumption choices follow from static optimization. The game is solved by backward induction.
2  stage: Optimal Investment  1 . Country W does not engage in substitution R&D if and only if the net gains fall short of the costs (
With expressions (10) and (13) this condition is
Country W's optimal strategy is thus expressed by the rule
The trade-off between costs and benets of substitution R&D are trivial if the cost  is prohibitive even under minimal (zero) supply of  in the second period. To rule out this case, assume that (17) is violated under  * 2 = 0, i.e., 11
1  stage: Optimal Supply  * 1 . In the rst stage country O may either prevent country W's substitution R&D or, alternatively, concede to it. If it prevents substitution R&D,  * 2 must satisfy condition (17). Since the term on the left of (17) is decreasing in  * 2 , condition (17) implicitly denes a lower bound on  * 2 , labeled  *  and satisfying (17) with equality. Noticing that the expression on the left of (17) is negative whenever  * 2   2 +  − 2, one has, by assumption (18)
By concavity of  * (see (14)), country O's optimal supply, conditional on  1 = 0, is
Intuitively country O can prevent substitution R&D by supplying enough of  in the second period so that it does not pay for W to develop the substitution technology.
1 1 The expression on the left of (18) is positive by   1.
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Clearly, whenever total resources  * are large (i.e.,  *  2 *  holds), country O is not constrained by this requirement and plays its unconstrained optimal strategy  * 1 =  * 2.
If preventing substitution R&D is too costly, country O may, alternatively, adjust to country W's R&D. In this case country O's optimal supply in the rst period is (see Appendix)
(21) Quantity  *  is the rst period's optimal supply conditional on conceding to  1 = . One can check that  *  ∈ (0  * ) holds in all cases. 12 In sum, country O sets rst-period supply either to (20), preventing substitution R&D or it sets (21), adjusting to substitution R&D. The equilibrium depends on the respective utilities under both strategies. To evaluate this trade-off, it is convenient to dene total utility under given supply and investment decisions as
Clearly, if country O concedes to W's R&D it obtains total utility
. The equilibrium strategy can be read from the sign of the difference of both expressions. The following proposition shows that the optimal decision rule -and hence the equilibrium strategy -depends in a simple way on total reserves  * .
so that under full information a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium exists, is unique, and is described by the strategies
1 2 Note also that the expression in the rst line falls short of  * 2 since under condition (16)  + 14 exceeds the value of the square root. For  *  0, however, the term in the third line is strictly larger than  * 2.
14 2n P N (i) observe that
where  *    * =  *  and (14) were used in the second step. For (ii)
which follows from (15). For (iii), observe that the Envelope Theorem implies
The intuition of the proposition is straight forward: country O's two goals are, on the one hand, to smooth supply according to the unconstrained rule (15) and, on the other, to discourage country W from investing in the substitution technology. Since a minimum supply in the second period ( * 2 ) is necessary to reach the second goal, the deviation from the optimal unconstrained path (15) -and the associated utility loss -is relatively large whenever the total reserves  * are low. Thus, the utility losses dominate the gains from preventing investment if and only if  * falls short of a threshold  0 . In this case, country O adjusts to  1 = . Figure 3 includes the unconstrained optimum i.e., the equal allocation over both periods,
, as a dotted line. Deviations from this strategy reect either country O's need to react to W's substitution capacity ( 2 = ) or, alternatively, its aim to prevent country W's investment. At  0 where country O is indifferent between preventing and conceding,  * 1 jumps down since
Apart from this discontinuity, supply in both periods is (weakly) increasing in  * .
Before closing this section it is worth contemplating the distortion of supply under prevention of country W's R&D. If country O chooses to prevent W's investment, world supply of  is distorted away from the optimal rule ( * 1 =  * 2 ) towards a more back-loaded supply ( * 1   * 2 ). This nding is reminiscent of earlier work on natural resource extraction and market structure: Hotelling (1931) writes of a "retardation of production under monopoly" and Quyen (1988) conrms that "the monopolist is excessively conservationist." These studies predict that the monopolist scaries supply in early periods, which creates a front-loaded stream of prots and a possibly longer duration of supply period. 13 The mechanism presented here, instead, is qualitatively different. Supply is partly delayed in order to generate abundant future supply and thus discourage country W's substitution R&D. The causality between future supply, incentives to engage in time-consuming R&D, and optimal supply has a clear orientation on the time-line and suggests that this deviation from the Hotelling rule is quite robust.
Proposition 1 has provided a description of the full information equilibrium. The next section analyzes the incentives to misreport under asymmetric information of reserves.
Asymmetric Information
This section formalizes country O's incentives to misreport the reserves of the natural resource  . The suitable framework for this analysis is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in a signaling game.
Within this framework, a player with private information can be said to actively deceive other players if he conceals his type and benets from doing so. Applying this concept to the current model, one of country O's types will be said to misreport successfully if its signal is not informative about remaining reserves and if, in addition, this specic type enjoys higher utility in the resulting pooling equilibrium than under full information. By denition, successful misreporting and benecial pooling are the same thing. 14 With this denition I turn to the formal equilibrium concept next.
Equilibrium -Denition
The relevant actions of the signaling game are the following (compare Figure 2) . In the rst stage Nature decides on the realization of  * according to (1); country O observes the realization of  * but country W does not. The realization of  * denes two different types of country O indexed by  =   and labeled country O  in the case  * = and country O  if  * = . In the second stage country O signals its type with the rst period's supply 1 . (The tilde indicates all possible levels of supply, including those off-equilibrium.) In the third stage country W rationally updates its beliefs and chooses investment  1 ∈ {0 }. As shown in Section 2.3, export taxes follow expressions (10) and (12). The strategies
are said to be part of a Subgame Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SPBE) if they satisfy the following criteria
given W's strategies,   1 maximize O's total utility for  =  . E(ii) given O's strategies, W updates its believes using Bayes' rule E(iii)   1 ( 1 ) maximizes W's expected total utility under the updated beliefs. 
The equilibrium strategies of both players are indexed with the superscript  and are denoted by
Country W's equilibrium technology in the second period is   2 ∈ {0 }, where  =  . In a pooling equilibrium,  1 cannot be conditioned on country O's type and
holds.
For further references, it is useful to denote country O's full information equilibrium strategies (23) of type  =   as
Similarly, the variable  * 2 ∈ {0 } stands for country W's substitution technology in the second period of the full information equilibrium, given country O's type .
The existence and the characteristics of the signaling game's equilibrium is sensitive to the specication of the receiver's beliefs, including the off-equilibrium beliefs. The minimal requirement that the updating of beliefs follow Bayes' rule leaves a wide range of offequilibrium beliefs that generally sustain a large number of equilibria. The equilibria will therefore be constrained by the following reasonable renements of beliefs. 15
Assumptions A(i) and A(ii) simply formulate the requirement of Bayesian updating. A(iii) requires that, if O  does not gain from imitation of O  's full information strategy ( * 1 ) relative to its own full information strategy ( * 1 ), then W, when observing  * 1 , believes in  =  with certainty. This assumption implies that O  plays its full information strategy whenever it does not pay for O  to pool to  * 1 . A(iii) thereby establishes the full information equilibrium as the default outcome. 16 Conversely, this implies that a pooling equilibrium only exists if no separating equilibrium exists, which includes the full 1 5 Renements A(iii) -A(v) are remniscent of the of the Intuitive Criterion in Cho and Kreps (1987) . 1 6 This statement follows from two observations: First,  * 1 is O  's unique optimal strategy under full information. Second, asymmetric information adds one more constraint to O 's optimization program information strategies. -A(iv) requires that, if O  gains from a deviation to 1 relative to an equilibrium outcome   1 provided that ( 1 ) =  and if, further, O  prefers to pool to that deviation 1 rather than to resort to its full information equilibrium, then W, when actually observing strategy 1 , is agnostic about O's type and sticks to its prior beliefs (( 1 ) = ). This assumption eliminates all equilibria that render the high type less utility than the pooling equilibrium with maximal utility for the high type. -Finally, A(v) requires that, whenever O  looses from a deviation to 1 relative to the equilibrium provided that ( 1 ) =  while O  gains from a deviation to relative to its current equilibrium outcome provided that ( 1 ) = , then W, when observing strategy 1 , believes in  =  with certainty (( 1 ) = 0). This assumption ties O  to the equilibrium strategy that is benecial for O  .
Equilibrium -Characterization
TO characterize the equilibria under asymmetric information, consider rst country W's choice. Compared with the full information, country W's situation changes to the extent that, at the time of making the R&D decision it may face subjective uncertainty about the second period's supply of the natural resource. Consequently, its optimal strategy is now taken on the basis of the expected returns to substitution R&D, where expectations are formed using subjective probabilities. More precisely, country W's strategy is based on a probabilistic analog of inequality (17), which, when using the denition of , can be written as
In (24)  * 2 () stands for the optimal export tax (10) under  2 = 0. Condition (24) determines country W's investment behavior and 17
Country O's optimal strategy does not follow such a handy rule. As in the case of full information, country O gains from depressing the investment in substitution R&D but (the incentive compatibility constraint in the case of a separating and the probabilistic equivalent of (17) with prior probabilities  and 1− in the case of a pooling equilibrium -see (24)) so that in all equilibria of the signaling game O  obtains weakly less utility than in the full information equilibrium. Thus, whenever O  looses from pooling to  loses from deviations of its optimal supply rules. When engaging in signaling, country O aims to prevent country W's substitution R&D at the cost of distorted supply. This trade-off between country O's costs and benets of the signal is central to the computation of the equilibrium. It will prove useful to dene the limits on the rst period's supply 1 which, disregarding information asymmetries, set the bounds of country O's willingness to discourage substitution R&D. Such thresholds must leave country O indifferent between successfully inducing  1 = 0 and conceding to  1 = . Using (22), a lower bound  is implicitly dened by    * 2 and
By this denition,  depends on total reserves  * and some of its properties can be inferred from (26).
Claim 1  satises the following properties.
(i)  is well dened and unique for
By Claim 1 (i), the threshold  is a function of  * and can be written as ( * ). Concavity of  * |  2 =0 (see (14)) and    * 2 implies that the value ( * ) constitutes a lower bound on the quantities which country O, endowed with  * , is willing to supply in the rst period to prevent country W from engaging in substitution R&D. Finally, the symmetry of  * ( * 1   * 2  0) in the rst two arguments implies that the function
establishes the corresponding upper bound on the quantities  * 1 . Figure 4 illustrates these bounds ( * ) and  ( * ) as dashed lines, the solid line represents the equilibrium  * 1 under full information. By Claim 1 (iv) and (v), the functions ( * ) and  ( * ) are increasing in  * , lie within the interval (0  * ), and satisfy ( * )   * 2   ( * ). Country O, endowed with  * , is willing to supply any  * 1 ∈ [( * )  ( * )] in the rst period if this prevents substitution R&D in country W (i.e., induces  1 = 0). Notice that, since country O optimally concedes to  1 =  for  *   0 , the threshold ( * ) lies above the line  * − *  in this range, i.e.,  *   0 implies ( * )   * − *  . Conversely, for  *   0 country O optimally prevents investment in R&D, hence ( * )   * −  *  in this range. The functions ( * ) and  * −  *  intersect at the value  * =  0 where country O is indifferent between conceding to  1 =  and preventing it.
With the denitions of  and  and the properties summarized in Claim 1 it is possible to give a rst irrelevance result and to formulate specic conditions for the realizations  and under which the information asymmetries do not impact the real world economy at all. These conditions are spelled out in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that at least one of the following conditions holds
(ii)  ()  −  *  then the SPBE in pure strategies is unique and characterized by the full information strategies (23). In particular, the SPBE is a separating equilibrium.
Proof. Observe rst that A(iii) implies that O  plays its full information strategy  *
1
whenever it does not pay for O  to pool to  * 1 , i.e. when
holds. This statement follows from two basic observations. First,  * 1 is O  's unique optimal strategy under full information. Second, O  obtains weakly less utility in an equilibrium of the signaling game than under full information, because asymmetric information adds one constraint to O  's optimization program (the incentive compatibility constraint in the case of a separating and (24) in the case of a pooling equilibrium). Now, 21 whenever (28) holds A(iii) grants that O  obtains its maximum (full information) utility by playing   1 =  * 1 . It is thus sufficient to show (28). Assume now that (i) holds. If   0 W plays  1 =  in the full information equilibria under  * = . In this case
by optimality of  * 1 under full information.
If, instead,  2 *  , (20) implies that O  's full information strategy is  * 1 = 2. Distinguish now two cases: rst, under   2 *  then (28) holds since
Second, under   2 *  one has
where the rst line employs symmetry of  * (  0), the strict inequality follows from (14) together with symmetry of  * (  0) and the weak inequality from follows from (23).
Assume next that (i) is violated so that  * 1 = −  *  but (ii) holds. These conditions and the denition of  (27) imply ( )   − ( −  *  )   −  *  and hence  * 2 = . Thus, by construction of  and 
holds. This proves the statement.
The rst part of the proposition, related to condition (i), reects that for very large, the low type's pooling strategy is more costly than inducing  1 = 0 directly, i.e., under revelation of its type. Similarly, for small (   0 ) even the high type optimally concedes to  1 =  and there is no gain for O  that compensates for the cost of pooling. Figure 5 illustrates the result of Proposition 2 related to condition (ii). Whenever  is small and lies below the value  −1 ( −  *  ), the gure shows that the high type's full information strategy −  *  lies outside the interval [( )  (())], which comprises all signals O  is willing to set in order to induce  1 = 0. Consequently, it can be ruled out that the low type pools to the strategy −  *  , since this would render strictly less utility than her full information strategy. Thus, under any of these conditions, the two types resort to the respective full information strategies.
Having excluded the existence of pooling equilibria for some parameter range, the attention rests on the remaining parameter range. Thus, rest of the section will focus on the cases where conditions
and
are satised. Conditions (29) and (30) assure that type O  gains from imitating O  's full information strategy  * 1 if that discourages substitution R&D. Under such pooling attempts, however, country W adapts its beliefs so that the full information strategy  * 1 cannot be part of a pooling equilibrium. Instead, the natural candidate for the signal of a pooling equilibrium is the quantity that solves (24) with equality under prior beliefs  ≡ . Let this value be denoted by    , dened as the implicit solution of
where  * 2 () stands for the second period's export tax (10) under  2 = 0. One quickly veries that the expression on the left of (31) is decreasing in export taxes and, hence, by (10), is increasing in    . Equation (10) implies further that the term in the rst slanted brackets is larger than the term in the second slanted brackets and, therefore, the whole 21 expression on the left of (31) is decreasing in . Finally, the expression on the left on (31) is decreasing in . These observations, together with the implicit function theorem, imply that the threshold    is increasing in  and . Notice also that at  = 1 condition (31) coincides with (17) in which case    = − *  while at  = 0 (31) leads to    =  − *  . Summarizing, one has
The difference
and O  's full information strategy reects that country W reacts to O  's incentives to pool, by revising expected future supply of  downward relative to the full information equilibrium under  * = . To compensate for this drop of expected future supply, O  must further increase the second period supply if she wants to discourage country W's R&D. Hence     −  *  holds. In addition to country W, type O  also reacts to O  's pooling attempts, and may indeed choose not to discourage substitution R&D. In this case, O  's incentives to pool cease to exist. This introduces an additional condition to be satised in a pooling equilibrium: the relevant signal    must be element of the set [( )  ( )]. Since conditions (33) and (34) imply     −  *  and since −  *   2 by (29), the relevant constraint is
Now remember that    is a function of  and  so that condition (36) implicitly denes a constraint on the parameters  and . In particular, the equation    = ( ) denes a schedule on the ( )-plane which, by virtue of properties (32) and (33), represents a decreasing function () that limits the region within which a pooling equilibrium may exist. For values of  (), condition (36) is violated and type O  does not induce
These observations suggest that -in addition to the necessary conditions (29) and (30) -the requirement (36) is necessary for a pooling equilibrium to exists. The following proposition identies conditions (29), (30), and (36) as jointly sufficient, granting that the two-stage signaling game has a pooling equilibrium in pure strategies, which is -modulo country W's off-equilibrium beliefs  and strategies -unique. Proposition 3 If (29), (30), and (36) hold, a SPBE in pure strategies exists. Moreover, all SPBE in pure strategies include the strategies
Proof. See Appendix. Figure 6 illustrates the two key conditions (30) and (36) that delimit the range for the parameters  and  where pooling equilibria prevail. Condition (30) sets a minimum that  needs to exceed, represented by the dashed vertical line in the gure. Condition (36) denes a minimum () that the ex ante probability  must exceed to grant (36). The function () is marked as a bold line. Both conditions are satised for parameters within the area A. Notice with (33) and (35) that for   £ ( ) +  *  ¤  , the value    exceeds ( ) for any probability  ∈ [0 1], in which case the requirements on  are empty and hence the bold line hits the -axis at the value
To the left of the dashed line, in area B, condition (30) is violated. Hence Proposition 2 (ii) applies and the unique equilibrium in pure strategies are those replicating the full information equilibrium ( * 1 and  * 1 ( * 1 ) for  =  , respectively). Finally, if (30) holds but (36) is violated (area C in Figure 6 ), type O  optimally chooses not to induce  1 = 0 under O  's pooling attempts. Consequently, O  lacks incentives to pool. While a formal proof is omitted here, the equilibrium strategies can be shown to follow the supply rules (21) for  * =   , respectively: a separating equilibrium prevails, with O  deviating from its full information strategies.
One important feature of the pooling equilibria characterized in Proposition 3 remains to be highlighted. This feature concerns the cost of signaling. Observe that the signal, which the low type must incur in order to imitate the high type is restricted to lie on the grey vertical line in Figure 5 . For the adequate size of low reserves ( ) this implies that the signal of the pooling equilibrium (   ) lies strictly closer to the unconstrained optimal supply (2) of the low type, thus generating additional benets. Formally, this property can be stated as follows.
Since    is increasing and continuous in  there is a  0 so that
To what extent does the Corollary relate to the cost of signaling? Quite generally in signaling games, one of the informed types receives information rents by making the uninformed player choose a strategy that benets the informed type compared to its full information payoffs. Obviously, when separating the cost from the benet of the signal, the cost must be dened by holding constant the induced benet. In this sense, the cost of signaling can be dened as the change in the informed type's payoffs that the necessary signal generates, conditional on inducing the (desired) asymmetric information strategy of the uninformed player. The change is measured relative to the natural benchmark, i.e., relative to the full information strategy. Applying this denition to the present setting, the cost that the low type O  incurs by setting the signal is captured by the expression
When read in this way, the corollary presents a striking insight of the model. It shows that, for a wide parameter range, the cost of signaling is actually negative for the low overreporting type O  . Put differently, the overreporting supplier gains not only from preventing W's substitution R&D but also form the very fact of signaling itself.
This fact is somewhat surprising. One could reasonably expect that this cost is proportional to the degree by which reserves are actually overstated -so that "bigger lies bear bigger costs". This guess proves wrong. Instead, an overreporting exporter may actually gain not only from the implication of overreporting but also from signaling (or "lying") itself. Thus, the general principle, according to which the low type trades off the gains from pooling against the cost of the signal, does not apply in the present model.
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The fundamental reason for this result is the following. The high type, O  , who loses from pooling vis-a-vis separation, would like to signal her high reserves. Since high reserves come along with high supply the obvious way to signal would seem to increase the rst period's supply. But this is not viable signal, since the preventing R&D precisely requires a minimum supply in the second period. Any increase in the rst period's supply would thus reduce the remaining reserves, decrease the second period's (expected) supply and hence trigger country W's R&D. The natural way to signal high reserves is barred by the incentive compatibility constraint (24).
Consequently, the costs of signaling do not impost a clear quantitative restriction on the existence of pooling equilibria.
Pooling Equilibrium -Discussion
By the earlier denition type O  is said to misreport its reserves if its equilibrium action  * 1 does not reveal its type and its utility in the resulting pooling equilibrium is higher than in the respective full information equilibrium.
Applying this denition and observing that, relative to the full information outcome, the low type benets from pooling (granted by condition (30)), the low type O  is said to overreport its reserves in all equilibria characterized in Proposition 3. Conversely, the high type looses in all pooling equilibria (check that conditions (29), (33) and (34) imply 2 and apply (14) ). The analysis thus shows that, under the stated conditions, oil suppliers have incentives to over-but not to underreport.
Without formally extending the model, the next paragraphs will discuss the conditions of the main results as well as the modelling framework under which they have been derived.
The Pooling Equilibrium. The conditions for credible overreporting (Proposition 3) can be summarized by two simple and intuitive requirements. First, the lower bound of condition (29) requires that, under full information, the high type prevents country W's R&D activity. If this condition is violated, substitution R&D took place irrespective of the realization  * and the goal to prevent substitution R&D could not be realized by overreporting -rendering overreporting useless. Second, the costs arising from the signal must be limited for both players: the upper bound of (29) and condition (30) imply that the low type's costs of overreporting do not exceed the gains. Similarly, if the high type's distortions from the pooling equilibrium are too costly (condition (36) is violated) then the pooling equilibrium ceases to exist since, in that case, the high type concedes to R&D activity. If any of these conditions is violated, the necessary signal introduces excessive distortions of supply and is too costly.
Finally, underreporting does not occur. This observation raises the question why, in the current model, anticipated future oil shortages do not raise current prices, thereby mo-25 tivating oil suppliers to underreport. This result is due to the fact that storage cost are assumed to be prohibitive: it is well known that the marginal cost of storage reects the inter-temporal price spread (see, e.g., Working (1949) ) as long as demand for storage is positive. Prohibitive storage costs, in turn, decuple inter-temporal markets and market prices, thus eliminating incentives to misreport. In this sense, the model's setup is loaded in favor of overreporting. I do not, however, apologize for this bias. Including these incentives to underreport would add a simple mechanism at the considerable cost of further complication. The present paper, instead, focusses on modelling the less intuitive incentives to overreport.
Modelling framework. The analysis above relies on a set of assumptions that made the model tractable but require a brief discussion.
First, good  is supplied monopolistically. This assumption is crucial since it enables the exporter of good  to control the intertemporal distribution of aggregate reserves and thereby manipulate the importer's substitution R&D. The assumption can be read as a simplication for non-competitive supply in general, as in Pindyck (1978) . Extensions to oligopolistic supply, however, should be possible. Thus, in the (natural) case of competition through quantities, the incentives for suppliers to prevent R&D and overreport are reduced but do not vanish, since oligopolists still partially internalize the incentives that operate on the industry-level.
Second, substitution R&D is a binary choice. 19 This is a convenient simplication but not a crucial assumption. A natural generalization would introduce the productivity  of the substitution technology in (4) as a continuous function of total R&D expenditure  1 ∈ R + . Intuitively, under full information, the equilibrium ( 1 ) is then a decreasing function of the second period's supply  * 2 and of total reserves  * . Hence, the scenario preserves country O's incentives to overreport in order to discourage marginal substitution efforts and reduce the intensity of foreign competition in period two. Also, in a pooling equilibrium the signal may still be arbitrarily close to the low type's rst best supply  *  =  2, rendering negative signaling cost for the low type.
Third, there is only one importer of good  . Country W's gains from substitution R&D accrue via reductions in export taxes while domestic production is zero for a wide parameter range. 20 Consequently, no private enterprise can recoup the investment  1 = , which must therefore be nanced publicly. Whenever many small countries import  , free-riding effects among these  -importers arise regarding R&D expenditures, thus harming the paper's mechanism. One may, however, conjecture that the paper's logic remains intact in a world where substitution technologies, once invented, deliver a ow of good  (as in the case of some renewable energies) or, in another scenario, where consumers choose between alternative durable equipment that affect future aggregate demand for  . In such cases, the returns to substitution R&D are appropriable and mitigate the free-riding problem. 21 The paper's key insight can be expected to carry over to such scenarios.
Fourth, there is no aggregate uncertainty about resources and outcomes of R&D. Under such additional uncertainty, the trade-off between country W's cost and benets of substitution R&D and country O's prevention of R&D is based on expected utilities (affecting conditions (17), (22), and (24)). It appears unlikely that this change can overturn the qualitative results.
Fifth, oil is traded between two countries -instead of a generic prot-maximizing seller and a generic buyer. Adopting this standard framework instead would neglect the oil exporter's utility losses that arise from by her own signaling and the accompanying distortions of global oil supply. 22 Abstracting from these costs of overreport would bias the modeland load it to generate pooling equilibria.
Finally, the oil-exporter levies export taxes  *  . This additional policy tool tends to complicate the analysis. For a justication of this complication, recall that country W's benet from R&D accrue mainly through a reduction of country O's market power in the oil-market at  = 2 (see also the discussion following equation (16)). A comprehensive analysis must therefore involve the prime tool through which country O exercises its market power in the foreign market. This tool is traditionally quantity control or, equivalently, export taxes. 23 More importantly, in absence of a meaningful tool to extract monopoly rents, it is a priori unclear which of the two types, O  or O  , loses more from country W's R&D and which of them, therefore, rather decides to prevent this R&D. With this question unanswered, an analysis that tries to assess which type imitates whom must necessarily remain shaky.
The Crude Oil Market
Motivated by rising concerns about energy security, this paper has developed a model to address the questions why, how, and under what conditions crude oil reserves may be overreported. It has shown that exporting countries indeed have motives to overreport and that they can credibly do so under rational expectations. The minimal conditions for overreporting are intuitive: substitution R&D must respond signicantly to expected 2 1 Part of the free-riding problem remains as non-investing agents gain from reduced prices of the conventional resource due to a drop in demand. 2 3 Export taxes are also equivalent to import tariffs (see Helpman and Krugman (1989) ).
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29 future supply and supply itself needs to be non-competitive. This subsection briey addresses the remaining of the initial questions: Can overreporting be refuted for today's oil market?
To answer this question the two key assumptions of the model are to be checked: a strong reaction of substitution R&D to expected future supply and supply needs to be noncompetitive. Concerning the rst condition, evidence suggests that substitution R&D indeed responds to shortages of the market. Figure 1 illustrates that non-oil energy R&D in IEA member countries and world oil prices comove in the period . In addition, current prices strongly correlate with price forecasts in the relevant period (see Lynch (2002) and IMF (2003)). Together, these observations imply a comovement between expected future supply and R&D activity. Of course, raw correlations do not imply causality. Yet, empirical studies show that energy saving R&D is indeed responsive to supply shortages (see Newell et al (1999) and Popp (2002) ) so that the rst of the necessary conditions seems to be satised. The second requirement of non-competitive oil markets may appear obvious. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, empirical literature is inconclusive about OPEC's actual market power. Some quantitative studies indicate that in the years following the counter-oil shock in 1986, OPEC countries failed to behave as a cartel and over-supplied the world market instead of under-supplying it (Almoguera and Herrera (2007) and Lin (2007) ). Yet, other empirical studies such as Griffin (1985) and Smith (2003) , report strong coordination and cartel discipline of OPEC members and a signicant shortage of contemporaneous supply. If the latter studies are to be believed, the present paper's two fundamental assumptions do hold.
Finally, Proposition 3 requires that the cost of the signal be limited. A thorough quantitative assessment of the likelihood of overreporting must clearly involve these costs. Within a rst qualitative application of the theory, however, this requirement does not serve as a meaningful criterion since, by the Corollary to Proposition 3, there is no positive lower bound on the cost of signaling.
In sum, the possibility of overreporting in today's oil market cannot be easily refuted by applying the present paper's predictions qualitatively. Thus, the last -and to the policymaker the most relevant -of the initial questions remains unanswered. 24 This observation calls for a thorough quantitative research of the issue, which may at the same time answer the question whether the interpretation of OPEC as a cartel of supply is to be extended to a cartel of information.
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Conclusion
Concerns are rising about the supply security of crude oil. In addition to geological and political risks, some experts point at overreporting as one -possibly signicant -source of uncertainty, claiming that crude oil reserves are much lower than commonly assumed. While many market experts disagree with the assertions of the "Peak Oilists," the economic consequences of potential supply disruptions could arguably be dire.
Motivated by these observations, the present paper has provided a simple but suggestive model for the analysis of the exporters' costs and incentives to overreport crude oil reserves. The key assumptions of the theory are, rst, market power of oil suppliers, second, the possibility to engage in R&D to substitute oil, and third, private information about remaining oil reserves. It has been shown that, within this framework, the one incentive to overreport can be attributed to the aim of exporters to discourage importers' R&D for substitution technologies. Surprisingly, an exporter with low reserves can pretend to own high reserves at negligible or even negative costs. Finally, conditional on the reported realizations of reserves, supply is partly delayed under successful overreporting.
The standard discourse on security of crude oil supply involves a number of technical and political aspects, among which overreporting ranks rather low. It is therefore appropriate to briey consider the broader picture, which the economics of natural resources sketches. This general image is very comforting when uncertainties are absent: the continued exhaustion of a natural resource raises the returns to resource-saving substitution technologies, which are eventually generated by intensifying research (see Davidson (1978) , Deshmukh and Pliska (1983) and Tsur and Zemel (2003) ). In this process forward-looking rms anticipate future prots and, motivated by consumer's willingness to pay for steady consumption ows, grant a smooth transition between a resource-and a substitution-based regime. This picture, however, changes under uncertainty, when (information) shocks cause ex-post inefficiencies. Since such efficiency losses typically grow with the degree of uncertainty, the relevant issue is to identify the sources and magnitudes of uncertainties. Traditionally, geological and political unknowns are considered as the major sources of uncertainty. Today, advanced exploration technology allows quite accurate assessments of the size of oil elds and tough surprises due to technological drawbacks are argued to be unlikely (see e.g. Cuddington and Moss (2001) ). Thus, man-made or on-the-ground uncertainty appears to be the remaining source of uncertainty. Within that category, political instability is usually focused on -in particular that arising from the geopolitical situation in the Middle East (see, e.g., IEA (2005)). Yet, if alleged overreporting of about a quarter of world crude oil reserves cannot be refuted, then the resulting supply shocks could prove most damaging. Therefore, at last, overreporting may deserve a bit more attention after all.
29
31
A Appendix
Proof of (21). For  2 = 0 use  *  from (13) to compute with the help of the envelope theorem  * 1  * 1 =  * 1 + 1 ( * 1 + 2) 2 + 1  * 1 + 2 = 1 ( * 1 ) 2 where (10) with  1 = 0 was used in the second step. Use (10) with  2 =  and (13) to write  * 2 = ln( * 2 ) +  * 2 + 1 − 1 so that  * 2  * 2 = 1 * 2 . With  * 2  * 2 = 1 and  * 1  * 2 = −1 optimality requires
With (10) and  * 1 +  * 2 =  * rewrite this as (
Taking squares on both sides and solving for  * 1 leads to
The negative root is ruled out with the condition  * =  − 1 ⇒  * 1 = 0. The relevant condition for  2 = 0 to hold is  * 2  2( − 1), which is equivalent to  *    where solves Consider now  *    as long as O exports  (i.e.  * 2   * 2 ) (13) applies and  * 2 +  2 + 2 = 2 imply  * 2  * 2 = 1 so that optimality requires ( * 1 ) 2 =  or  * 1 =  2 +  − 2. The relevant conditions for  2  0 and  * 2   * 2 to hold is
or  * ∈ (2 − ( √ 4 + 5 + 1)2 3 + √  − 4). Finally, if  *  2 − ¡√ 4 + 5 + 1 ¢ 2 optimality requires  * 1 =  * 2 =  * 2 or  * 1 = 2 + 18 √ 8 + 25 − 58.
Proof of Claim 1. First, dene the expression on the left of the identity (26) by ∆( *  ). Now, by the denition (22) of  * ( * 1   * 2  0) and concavity of  *  (14) the partial derivative   ∆ is negative
